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Abstract
We discuss some diﬃculties in a dynamic New-Keynesian model with stag-
gered price setting à la Calvo and a convex capital adjustment cost at the ﬁrm
level, as considered by Woodford (2003, Ch. 5). It is shown that the implied
simultaneous price setting and investment decision has not been analyzed
properly. Our work ﬁlls that gap by proposing a tractable solution to the key
problem of describing the inﬂation dynamics associated with that structure.
We use our framework to assess to what extent capital accumulation matters
for inﬂation and output dynamics.
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11 Introduction
By now there exists a large literature studying macroeconomic dynamics in general
equilibrium models with sticky prices. However, it is generally assumed that labor
is the only productive input1 or alternatively that the capital stock in the economy
is held constant.2 Woodford (2003, p. 352) comments on these modeling choices:
‘[...] while this has kept the analysis of the eﬀects of interest rates on aggregate
demand quite simple, one may doubt the accuracy of the conclusions obtained,
given the obvious importance of variations in investment spending both in business
ﬂuctuations generally and in the transmission mechanism for monetary policy in
particular.’ Woodford (2003, Ch. 5) makes important progress in analyzing capital
accumulation in general equilibrium models with staggered price setting. First, he
observes that the widely used assumption of a rental market for capital could imply
that a substantial part of the aggregate capital stock shifts each period from low
demand to high demand producers. This is unrealistic, and more importantly, it
has non-trivial implications for the determination of marginal costs at the ﬁrm level,
hence for price setting decisions and for inﬂation dynamics. Second, he observes that
the marginal return to capital is given by the marginal savings in a ﬁrm’s labor cost
as opposed to its marginal revenue product of capital: with price staggering, ﬁrms
are demand constrained. Hence, the return from having an additional unit of capital
in place derives from the fact that this allows to produce the quantity that happens
to be demanded at a lower marginal cost.
Assuming that ﬁrms make investment decisions implies that price setters face an
intricate simultaneous choice problem. Woodford (2003, p. 357) notes: ‘The capital
stock aﬀects a ﬁrm’s marginal cost, of course; but more subtly, a ﬁrm considering
how its future proﬁts will be aﬀected by the price it sets must also consider how
its capital stock will evolve over the time that its price remains ﬁxed.’ However, as
1See, e.g., Clarida et al. (1999).
2Erceg et al. (2000) assume a constant aggregate capital stock combined with a rental market
for capital, while Sbordone (2001) assumes a constant capital stock at the ﬁrm level.
2we argue, Woodford (2003, Ch. 5) does not solve in a correct way the price setting
problem in the presence of an investment decision at the ﬁrm level. In a nutshell:
he appears not to have assessed correctly over what set of future states of the world
an optimizing Calvo price setter forms expectations.3
We reconsider the structure in Woodford (2003, Ch. 5), i.e. our model features
staggered price setting à la Calvo and convex adjustment costs in the process of
capital accumulation at the ﬁrm level. We propose a tractable solution to the key
problem of characterizing the inﬂation dynamics associated with that structure. In
particular, we suggest a simple approximate inﬂation equation, and show that it can
be used without any sizeable loss of accuracy.
Our ultimate goal is to assess the extent to which capital accumulation matters
for inﬂation and output dynamics. To this end we compare impulse responses to
a shock in the exogenous growth rate of money balances for two cases: our base-
line model with endogenous capital (henceforth baseline) and a speciﬁcation with
decreasing returns to scale resulting from a constant capital stock at the ﬁrm level
(henceforth DRS). We ﬁnd the following: ﬁr s t ,t h er e s p o n s eo fo u t p u ti sh i g h e ri n
the former — both on impact and during the transition period. Second, the inﬂa-
tion dynamics are similar in the two models. The intuition is as follows: there are
two opposite eﬀects from endogenous capital accumulation on the determination of
marginal costs. On the one hand, the additional production triggered by invest-
ment demand increases marginal costs in the baseline model with respect to the
DRS speciﬁcation. On the other hand, the resulting additional capital increases the
economy’s productive capacity thereby decreasing marginal costs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 outlines the baseline
model. In particular, it is shown why the price setting problem associated with that
structure has not been solved in a correct way in Woodford (2003, Ch. 5). In section
3 we conduct the above mentioned simulation exercise. At this step, we also check
the accuracy of our approximation to the inﬂation equation. Section 4 concludes.
3The same critique applies to Casares (2002).
32T h e M o d e l
We follow the general equilibrium structure outlined in Woodford (2003, Ch. 5).4
Our focus is on the ﬁrms’s behavior, while a short exposition of the household’s
problem is left to the Appendix.
2.1 Outline of the Model Structure
There are two sectors, households and ﬁrms. The latter produce diﬀerentiated goods
and act under monopolistic competition. The only aggregate uncertainty comes from
the growth rate of money balances, which we assume to follow an AR(1) process:
∆mt = ρm∆mt−1 + εt, (1)
where mt denotes the log of nominal money balances Mt at time t.T h ea u t o r e g r e s -
sive parameter ρm is assumed to be strictly positive and less than one. Finally, εt is
iid with zero mean and variance σ2
ε.
Households are modeled in a standard way. They choose labor supply and con-
sumption demand with the objective of maximizing lifetime utility. Consumption
is given by a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of all the goods produced in the economy.
The elasticity of substitution between goods is constant and given by ε. Households
have access to complete ﬁnancial markets and supply labor in a perfectly competitive
labor market.5
Firms are indexed on the unit interval. Each ﬁrm i produces a diﬀerentiated
good with the objective of maximizing the present value of its dividend stream.




4He considers a more general structure than ours. However, this is irrelevant for our discussion of
the conceptual problem in his treatment of the simultaneous price setting and investment problem.
5For a formal statement of the household’s problem and the associated optimality conditions,
see Appendix 1.
4where Kt (i) and Nt (i) denote, respectively, capital holdings and labor input used
by ﬁrm i in its period t production denoted Yt (i).
Each ﬁrm i makes an investment decision at any point in time with the resulting
additional capital becoming productive one period after the investment decision is
made. It is assumed that the investment good is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of all
of the goods in the economy with the same constant elasticity of substitution as in
the consumption aggregate. Firms are assumed to face convex adjustment costs of
changing their capital holdings. Given ﬁrm i’s time t capital stock Kt (i) the amount
of the composite good It (i) that has to be purchased by that ﬁrm at this point in







The function I(·) has the following characteristics: I(1) = δ, I0(1) = 1 and I00(1) =
 ψ.T h ep a r a m e t e rδ denotes the depreciation rate and  ψ > 0 measures the convex
capital adjustment cost in a log-linear approximation to the equilibrium dynamics.
Firms post sticky prices à la Calvo (1983), i.e. each period a measure (1 − θ)
is randomly selected. Those ﬁrms change their prices and the remaining ﬁrms post









where Pt (i) denotes the nominal price posted at time t by ﬁrm i. Pt has the property
that the minimum expenditure required to purchase a bundle of goods resulting in
It (i) units of the composite good is given by PtIt (i).
Cost minimization by ﬁrms and households implies that demand for each indi-












t denotes aggregate demand at time t,w h i c hi sg i v e nb y :
Y
d
t ≡ Ct + It,
5where It ≡
R 1
0 It (i)di and Ct denote, respectively, aggregate investment demand
and the representative household’s consumption demand at time t.
2.2 Price Setting and Investment
The probability that a ﬁrm cannot adjust its price in any given period is given by
θ. Hence, with probability θ
k a price that was chosen at time t will still be posted
at time t + k. When setting a new price P∗
t (i) in period t ﬁrm i maximizes the
current value of its dividend stream over the expected lifetime of the chosen price.










t (i) − µMCt+k (i)]
ª
=0 , (6)
where µ ≡ ε
ε−1 is the frictionless mark-up over marginal costs, Qt,t+k is the stochastic
discount factor for random nominal payments, and MCt (i) denotes the nominal




















where Wt is the nominal wage and MPLt (i) denotes the marginal product of labor
of ﬁrm i in period t. The last equality follows from imposing Yt (i)=Y d
t (i) and
combining it with equations (2) and (5).
Equation (6) is the familiar ﬁrst order condition implied by the Calvo model:
optimizing price setters behave in a forward-looking manner, i.e. they take into
account not only current but also future expected marginal costs in those states of
the world where the chosen price is still posted. A price setter’s capital holdings in
those same states of the world result from its investment decisions. We turn to this
next.
6See Appendix 2 for a formal statement of the ﬁrms’ price setting and investment problems.













where MSt+1(i) denotes the nominal marginal savings in ﬁrm i’s labor cost asso-
ciated with having one additional unit of capital in place in period t +1 .T h e
intuition behind the last equation is the following: the marginal cost of installing an
additional unit of capital at time t (including the adjustment cost) is equalized to
the expected discounted marginal contribution to the ﬁrm’s value associated with
having that additional unit of capital in place at point in time t +1 . The latter is
given by the marginal return from using it for production, MSt+1 (i), and selling the
remaining capital after depreciation (net of the change in the time t+1adjustment
cost that is associated with the time t investment decision). As has been emphasized
by Woodford (2003, Ch. 5), the relevant measure of the marginal return to capital
is the marginal savings in a ﬁrm’s labor cost: ﬁrms are demand constrained and
hence the return from having an additional unit of capital in place results from the
fact that this allows to produce the quantity that happens to be demanded using
less labor.




















where MPKt+1 (i) denotes the marginal product of capital of ﬁrm i in period t+1.
T h el a s te q u a l i t yf o l l o w sf r o mi m p o s i n gYt+1 (i)=Y d
t+1 (i) and invoking equations
(2) and (5). With probability θ the ﬁrm’s nominal price Pt+1 (i) is the one that
was posted the period before, with probability (1 − θ) it is P∗
t+1 (i).T h i sa s p e c to fa
ﬁrm’s investment decision implies that price setters face an intricate problem. As we
argue next, the latter has not been solved in a correct way in the existing literature.
72.3 A Short Note on the Existing Literature
Woodford (2003, pp. 688 - 690) computes future expected capital holdings as far as
they are relevant for a log-linear approximation to the price setting problem without
considering that these depend to some extent on future expected optimally chosen
prices. However, equations (8) and (9) state that a time t price setter’s choice over
its next period’s capital stock takes rationally into account that its time t+1price
might be optimally chosen. In other words: the possibility of choosing a new price
at point in time t +1aﬀects a price setter’s time t investment decision and hence
its time t +1capital holdings, in particular, in those states of the world that are









Figure 1: Decision tree for time t price setter.
To ﬁx ideas we represent ﬁrm i’s price setting problem at time t by a simple tree,
which consists of the states of the world that are consistent with the current state S.
This is shown in Figure 1. Equations (6) and (7) prescribe that the relevant capital
holdings are associated with those states of the world where the newly set price
is still posted. These capital holdings are assumed to correspond to nodes S, S0,
S00,... in the tree. Firm i’s capital stock at node S is predetermined. Now consider
8ﬁrm i’s choice in period t over its next period’s capital stock Kt+1 (i).E q u a t i o n s( 8 )
and (9) state that this decision depends on the price setter’s expectation of its time
t +1relative price taking into account that this might be either the one associated
with node S0 or the one that is chosen at node S1.M o r e o v e r ,Kt+1(i) depends on
the price setter’s expectation of its time t +2capital stock, which might be either
the one that prevails at nodes S00 and S01 or the one that obtains at nodes S10
and S11.
Next we consider the equilibrium conditions associated with the baseline model,
and in particular, we propose a tractable approximation to the inﬂation equation.
2.4 Equilibrium
We restrict attention to a log-linear approximation to the equilibrium dynamics
around a symmetric equilibrium steady state with zero inﬂation. In what follows,
the percent deviation of a variable with respect to its steady state value is denoted
by a hat.
2.4.1 Market Clearing
Clearing of the labor market requires that hours worked, Nt,a r eg i v e nb yt h ef o l -



















t (i) denote, respectively, consumption and investment demand for
good i. Since an equation like (12) holds for each good in the economy we are
9entitled to integrate on both sides over all ﬁrms in the economy. After invoking (2)













Since we restrict attention to a log-linear approximation to the equilibrium dynamics
around a zero inﬂation steady state, we can write the log-linearized goods market
clearing condition in the following way:
b Yt =






b Kt+1 − (1 − δ) b Kt
i
, (14)






Based on the same argument the log-linearized aggregate production function is
given by:
b Yt = α b Kt +( 1− α) b Nt. (16)
2.4.2 Households
Log-linearizing and rearranging the ﬁrst order conditions associated with the house-
hold’s problem in Appendix 1 we obtain the following equilibrium conditions. The
household’s Euler equation is:
b Ct = Et b Ct+1 −
1
σ
(it − Etπt+1 − ρ), (17)
where σ is the household’s relative risk aversion, or equivalently, the inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and it denotes the nominal interest rate at
time t. The time discount rate is ρ ≡−logβ,w i t hβ denoting the discount factor.





= φ b Nt + σ b Ct, (18)
7The diﬀerence between Yt and aggregate output in the economy is of the second order, so we
can safely ignore it for the log-linear approximation to the equilibrium dynamics we are considering.
10where φ can be interpreted as the inverse of the Frisch aggregate labor supply elas-
ticity.







= b Yt − η(it − ρ), (19)
where η is the semi-elastisity of demand for real balances with respect to the nominal
interest rate.
2.4.3 Firms
First, we derive the law of motion of capital. A natural starting point is the log-
linearized real marginal savings in the labor cost of a ﬁrm i:
c mst(i)=c mst −
ε
1 − α
b pt (i) −
1
1 − α
b kt (i), (20)
where pt (i) ≡
Pt(i)
Pt , kt (i) ≡
Kt(i)
Kt ,a n dmst denotes the average real marginal savings







where MPLt and MPKt denote, respectively, the average time t marginal products
of labor and capital. They are obtained from (15).
Next we log-linearize the ﬁrst order condition for investment (8) and average over
all ﬁrms in the economy. Invoking the Euler equation (17) we obtain the following







Et b Kt+2 (22)
+
1 − β(1 − δ)
 ψ (1 + β)
Etc mst+1 −
1
 ψ (1 + β)
(it − Etπt+1 − ρ).
As the last equation shows, the existence of a capital adjustment cost implies that
the aggregate capital stock in the economy is a forward looking variable.
11Second, we characterize the inﬂation dynamics associated with the baseline
model. To this end, we average and aggregate price setting decisions in the way
described below. Our starting point is the log-linearized marginal cost at the ﬁrm
level. Denoting mct (i) ≡
MCt(i)
Pt and log-linearizing yields:
c mct (i)=c mct −
εα
1 − α
b pt (i) −
α
1 − α
b kt (i), (23)






We refer to b kt (i) as ﬁrm i’s capital gap at time t. The intuition behind equation (23)
is the following: for a zero capital gap a ﬁrm that posts a higher than average price
faces a lower than average marginal cost due to the decreasing marginal product
of labor. This is reﬂected in the second term, and it is exactly as in Sbordone
(2001) and Galí et al. (2001) for models with decreasing returns to scale and labor
as the only variable input in production.8 With capital accumulation there is an
extra eﬀect coming from the ﬁrm’s capital stock, which corresponds to the last term.
Conditional on posting the average price in the economy a ﬁrm that has a higher
than average capital stock in place faces a lower than average marginal cost. The
reason is that the marginal product of labor increases with the capital stock used
by the ﬁrm.




















k Etb kt+k (i), (25)
where ξ ≡
(1−βθ)(1−α)
1−α+εα ,a n dψ ≡
(1−βθ)α
1−α+εα.9 Hence, in addition to the usual inﬂation
and average marginal cost terms a ﬁrm’s optimal price setting decision does also
8For an early model, which features diﬀerences in marginal costs among producers, see Woodford
(1996).
9The price setting problem is stated in terms of variables that are constant in the steady state.
12depend on its current and future expected capital gaps over the (random) lifetime
of the chosen price. We outline next how the key problem of describing the inﬂation
dynamics associated with that structure can be solved.
We observe that in the zero inﬂation steady state a ﬁrm that is allowed to change
its price will optimally choose not to do so. This implies: limk→∞ Etb p∗
t+k (i)=0 .
Therefore, a time t price setter foresees that it will optimally choose a zero capital
gap in the inﬁnitely distant future. Formally: limk→∞ Etb kt+k (i)=0 . We iterate on
the following step:10 in the ﬁrst round a price setter behaves in a myopic way, i.e.
ﬁrm i posts a price b p
∗,1
t (i) consistent with the expectation that it will choose to have
a zero capital gap already from time t+1onward. The number in the superscript of
the last variable is meant to indicate the round of the iteration or, more colorfully,
the degree of sophistication in price setting that is assumed in its determination.
This way we can solve for the newly set myopic price b p
∗,1
t (i) in terms of aggregate
variables only, except for the current predetermined capital gap of ﬁrm i.I n t h e
second round a price setter is a bit more rational and chooses b p
∗,2
t (i) consistent with
the expectation that it will close its capital gap from time t+2onward. The newly
set price consistent with rational expectations is b p∗
t (i)=l i m k→∞Etb p
∗,k
t (i).A te a c h
step of the iteration we solve for the average newly set price. Since price setters are
randomly selected the current average capital gap in the group of price setters is zero.
Hence, the average newly set price in the economy is a function of aggregate variables
only. Next we invoke the price index and solve for the implied inﬂation equation. The
quantitative consequences of employing the diﬀerent inﬂation equations associated
with the steps of the iteration are analyzed in a simulation exercise. We turn to this
next.
10The details of the ﬁrst two steps of the iteration are given in Appendix 3. This also illustrates
the way one can obtain arbitrarily many steps.
133 Simulation Results
Given the speciﬁcation of monetary policy in (1), the equilibrium processes for the
nominal interest rate, output, hours, consumption, real wage, real balances, capital,
and inﬂation are given by equations (14), (16), (17), (18), (19), (22), and an inﬂation
equation, which can be found by the iteration outlined above. The average marginal
savings in labor costs and the average marginal cost in the economy are obtained
from equations (21) and (24), respectively.11
3.1 Calibration
The calibration of the model parameters in the baseline model is shown in Table 1.
The period lenght is one quarter. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is given
by 1
σ.A s s u m i n gσ =2is consistent with empirical estimates.12 Consistent with a
unit labor supply elasticity, we assume φ =1 . The semi-elasticity of demand for
real balances with respect to the nominal interest rate, η, is set to unity implying an
empirically plausible value of about 0.05 for the interest rate elasticity. The capital
share in the production function, α,i s0.36.W es e tβ =0 .99 implying an average
annual real return of about 4 percent. Setting θ =0 .75 means that the average
lifetime of a price is equal to one year. Consistent with the estimated autoregressive
process for M1 in the United States we assume ρm =0 .5 and σ2
ε =0 .1.13 Setting
ε =1 1implies a frictionless markup of 10 percent.14 We choose  ψ =3 ,a ss u g g e s t e d
by Woodford (2003, Ch. 5) and the references herein.
11To solve the dynamic stochastic system of equations we use Dynare
(http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare/).
12See, e.g., Basu and Kimball (2003) and the references herein.
13Our calibration of φ, α, β, θ, ρm,a n dσ2
ε is justiﬁed in Galí (2000) and the references herein.
14This is consistent with the estimate in Galí et al. (2001).
14Table 1: Calibration
The period length: one quarter
Preference parameters: σ =2 , φ =1 ,β=0 .99
Production function: α =0 .36
Elasticity of substitution between goods: ε =1 1
Capital accumulation: δ =0 .025,  ψ =3
Price stickiness: θ =0 .75
Money demand: η =1
Monetary policy: ρm =0 .5,σ 2
ε =0 .1
3.2 Results
We analyze impulse responses to a positive one standard deviation shock in the
growth rate of money balances. Our ﬁrst result regards the iteration outlined above.
We ﬁnd that the inﬂation equations at each step of the iteration are associated with
almost identical equilibrium dynamics. This is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows
that the diﬀerence in implied equilibrium dynamics between step 1 and step 20 of
the iteration is negligible. Moreover, this result is remarkably robust with respect to
the choice of the calibration. Therefore, we can use the inﬂation equation resulting
from step 1 of the iteration in order to characterize the equilibrium dynamics implied
b yt h eb a s e l i n em o d e l . 15 As we derive in Appendix 3, the latter equation takes the
following simple form:
πt = βEtπt+1 + κc mct, (26)
where κ ≡
ξ(1−θ)
θ . This is an interesting result: the Calvo assumption implies that
the current average capital gap in the (randomly selected) group of price setters is
15The only parameter that has some inﬂuence on this result is the capital adjustment cost
parameter  ψ.I n f a c t , f o r  ψ smaller than one, it might be desirable to iterate more than once
in order to characterize the resulting inﬂation dynamics. The special case without any capital
adjustment cost is analyzed by Sveen and Weinke (2003).








































Figure 2: The diﬀerence between step 1 and step 20 in response to a monetary policy
shock.
equal to zero. But, as has been emphasized by Woodford (2003, Ch. 5), this does
not imply that future expected average capital gaps for this group of ﬁrms would
b ee q u a lt oz e r oa sw e l l .H o w e v e r ,o u rﬁrst result shows that these future expected
capital gaps can be treated as if they were zero without any sizable loss of accuracy
in the determination of the equilibrium dynamics.
The intuition for this result is as follows: to the extent that there exists an
adjustment cost for capital the ﬁrm’s investment decision is forward-looking. If the
planning horizon for the investment decision is long enough, a price setter and a non-
price setter (both holding the same initial capital stocks) do not make very diﬀerent
investment decisions. The fact that they face the same probabilities of being allowed
or restricted to change their prices over the relevant planning horizon leads to a small
diﬀerence in their current investment decisions and, more generally, in their expected
investment policies. Moreover, it should be noticed that our equation (26) takes the










Figure 3: Output response to a monetary policy shock in the baseline model com-
p a r e dw i t ht h eD R Ss p e c i ﬁcation.
same functional form as the inﬂation equation that has been derived by Sbordone
(2001) and Galí et al. (2001) for models with decreasing returns to scale resulting
from a constant capital stock at the ﬁrm level. Our ﬁrst result therefore suggests
that the main diﬀerence between the baseline model and the DRS speciﬁcation lies
in the determination of the average marginal cost in the economy. The functional
form of the inﬂation equation itself is only aﬀected to some negligible extent by the
feature of endogenous capital accumulation at the ﬁrm level.
Second, we compare the responses to a monetary policy shock for the baseline
model and the DRS speciﬁcation. The result is shown is Figures 3 and 4: ﬁrst, output
is higher in the former — both on impact and during the transition period. Second,
the inﬂation dynamics are similar in the two models. The intuition is as follows:
there are two counteracting eﬀects from endogenous capital accumulation on the
determination of the marginal cost. First, investment spending adds to aggregate












Figure 4: Inﬂation response to a monetary policy shock in the baseline model com-
p a r e dw i t ht h eD R Ss p e c i ﬁcation.
demand, thereby implying higher production and an increase in the marginal cost
in response to the shock. Second, the additional capital resulting from investment
spending in one period increases the economy’s productive capacity in subsequent
periods. This implies a decrease in marginal costs. The latter is anticipated by
forward-looking price setters.
4C o n c l u s i o n
We should emphasize the three contributions of our paper. First, we discuss some
diﬃculties in a dynamic New-Keynesian model with staggered price setting à la
Calvo and a convex capital adjustment cost at the ﬁrm level, as considered by
Woodford (2003, Ch. 5). It is shown that the implied simultaneous price setting
and investment decision has not been analyzed properly in the existing literature.
18Second, our work ﬁlls that gap by proposing a tractable solution to the key problem
of describing the inﬂation dynamics associated with that structure. Third, we use
our framework to assess the extent to which the feature of endogenous capital accu-
mulation at the ﬁrm level implies inﬂation and output dynamics that are diﬀerent
from the ones associated with a speciﬁcation where the capital stock at the ﬁrm
level is held constant. The diﬀerence lies primarely in the output dynamics, while
the inﬂation dynamics are similar.
19Appendix 1: Households
Throughout the Appendix we use the notation and the deﬁnitions that have already






kU (Ct+k,N t+k), (A1)






















The maximization is subject to the following sequence of budget constraints:
Z 1
0
Pt (i)Ct (i)di + Et {Qt,t+1Dt+1} ≤ Dt + WtNt + Tt, (A4)
where Dt+1 is the nominal payoﬀ of the portfolio held at the end of period t,a n dTt
denotes proﬁts resulting from ownership of ﬁrms. Cost minimization by households









When combined with the assumptions stated in the text this structure implies the


















The ﬁrst equation is the optimality condition for labor supply, and the second is
a standard intertemporal optimality condition. The price of a risk-less one-period
bond is given by R
−1
t = EtQt,t+1,w h e r eRt denotes the gross nominal interest rate.
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t+k+1(i) with prob. 1 − θ
Pt+k(i) with prob. θ,
Kt (i) given.
Using the expressions for a ﬁrm’s nominal marginal cost and nominal marginal
savings in its labor cost given in equations (7) and (9), respectively, it follows that
P∗
t (i) and Kt+1(i) must satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions given in equations (6) and
(8), respectively. A ﬁrm j that is restricted to change its price at time t solves the
same problem, except for the fact that it takes Pt(j) as given. Note that the ﬁrst
order condition associated with the investment decision takes the same functional
form irrespective of whether a ﬁrm is allowed or restricted to change its price.
21Appendix 3: Iteration for Inﬂation Dynamics
We stick to the notation introduced in the main text of indicating the step number
in the superscript of each newly set relative price. For convenience, and since no
ambiguity can arise, we do not indicate, however, the step number for all the other
relevant variables.
We start by considering the log-linearized law of motion of the capital gap of an
individual ﬁrm i.T ot h i se n d ,e q u a t i o n( 8 )i sl o g - l i n e a r i z e da n dc o m b i n e dw i t ht h e
log-linearized law of motion of the aggregate capital stock in equation (22):











ω , χ ≡
β ψ
ω , ϕ ≡
(1−β(1−δ))ε




A myopic price setter i sets a relative price p
∗,1
t (i) at time t consistent with the step
one assumption that its capital gaps are expected to be closed already from the next











k Etc mct+k − ψb kt(i). (A9)
Averaging the last equation over all price setting ﬁrms, solving forward, and invoking
the price index we obtain equation (26) stated in the text:
πt = βEtπt+1 + κc mct. (A10)
Step 2
The step 2 assumption is that a price setter i chooses its relative price p
∗,2
t (i) consis-
tent with the expectation that its capital gaps are closed from period t+2onward.
















22Combining the step 2 assumption with equation (A8) we obtain:






t (i) − πt+1
¢





An expression for Etb p
∗,2












k Etc mct+1+k − ψb kt+1(i). (A13)
Equations (A11), (A12), and (A13) show that the ﬁrm faces a simultaneous
problem: price setting decisions and capital gaps depend on each other. We ﬁnd it




















k Etπt+k + ξ
P∞
k=0 (βθ)

























The elements in the ﬁrst row of matrix A are given by the following expressions:
a11 =
1 − ϕψ (1 − θ)
1 − ϕψ
¡












































23The resulting inﬂation equation is as follows:
πt = β1,2Etπt+1 + β2,2Etπt+2 + κ0,2c mct + κ1,2Etc mct+1, (A14)
where:
β1,2 ≡ β (θ + a11 (1 − θ)) + a12 (1 − θ)ϕ,
β2,2 ≡ β (1 − θ)(a13 − a12θϕ),
κ0,2 ≡
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